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Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry 
by Junwook Chi, Won. W. Koo, and Siew H. Lim
This	 paper	 explores	 price	 dispersion	 in	 the	 U.S.	 airline	 industry	 by	 highlighting	 differential	
individual	carriers’	pricing	strategies.	Using	instrumental	variables	(IV)	estimation,	the	results	show	
that	individual	carriers	play	crucial	roles	in	determining	price	dispersion,	implying	that	their	price	
discrimination	strategies	may	influence	variation	in	airfares.	Based	on	observed	price	dispersion	
and	average	price,	we	distinguished	sources	of	price	dispersion	and	found	that	the	pricing	strategies	
varied	across	U.S.	air	carriers.	In	2005,	for	example,	monopoly-type	price	discrimination	was	likely	
to	result	in	price	dispersion	for	Northwest,	whereas	competitive-type	price	discrimination	was	likely	
to	lead	to	price	dispersion	for	Delta.
INTRODUCTION
Airline pricing is dynamic and complicated because it involves multiple supply- and demand-driven 
conditions that shape the airlines’ strategies in different markets. Airline pricing research improves 
knowledge of market structure and competitiveness of the industry, and sheds light on carriers’ 
price discrimination practices. However, the extent of price discrimination practices is not readily 
assessable due to complicated discrimination factors, such as ticket restriction, days remaining 
until departure, and passenger groups. Without comprehensive information on the carriers’ price 
discrimination strategies, it is difficult to understand pricing behaviors in the domestic airline 
industry. 
Previous research has attempted to examine price discrimination in the U.S. airline industry. 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) use an inequality measure (the Gini coefficient) of airfares as a proxy of 
price discrimination. They find that price dispersion cannot be explained by cost differences1 alone 
and greater market competition is associated with higher levels of price dispersion in the domestic 
airline markets.2 A one standard deviation reduction in the Herfindahl-Hirschman (Herfindahl) 
Index from its mean is found to increase the Gini coefficient by 14%. Hayes and Ross (1998) modify 
the approach of Borenstein and Rose (1994) by using more dispersion measures and larger cross-
sectional data. They find that most dispersion is associated with “price wars” and peak-load pricing, 
whereas some discrimination is observed at monopolized endpoints. Accordingly, they conclude 
that there is an estrangement between price dispersion and price discrimination. In addition, Stavins 
(2001) focuses on the relationship between market power characteristics and price discrimination 
by examining the effects of ticket restrictions on airfares. The results show that the level of price 
discrimination is higher in more competitive markets and lower in less competitive markets. Thus, 
the study concludes that price discrimination increases as the market becomes more competitive. 
Furthermore, Carbonneau et al. (2004) find that price discrimination and market power are not 
positively correlated in the U.S. airline industry, thus, price discrimination alone is not evidence of 
market power. On the contrary, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find that market competition is negatively 
associated with price dispersion, which supports the traditional explanation of price discrimination.
While previous studies provided valuable information on price discrimination in the U.S. 
airline industry, the empirical findings were inconsistent. The inconsistencies may be explained 
by the different types of price discrimination, such as monopoly-type and competitive-type price 
discrimination.3 For example, Borenstein and Rose (1994) find that market competition appears 
to have a positive impact on price dispersion, but Gerardi and Shapiro (2007) provide the inverse 
influence of market competition on price dispersion. In traditional economic theory, a carrier uses 
price discrimination to maximize its profit in monopolistic markets, which results in a positive 
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relationship between market power and price dispersion (monopoly-type price discrimination). On 
the other hand, competitive market forces can increase the number of discounted airfares deviated 
from the full fares, leading to more price dispersion. This results in a negative relationship between 
market power and price dispersion (competitive-type price discrimination). Because market 
structures in most domestic segment markets range between monopoly and perfect competition, 
the markets are likely to have both monopolistic and competitive market forces.4 This indicates that 
markets may have offsetting impacts between these market forces, therefore, the impact of market 
power characteristics on price dispersion can be positive or negative, depending on the dominant 
effect of monopolistic or competitive markets forces. 
In addition, previous studies controlled for the effect of individual carriers by including carrier 
fixed-effects in their estimations and neglected the role of individual carriers and their pricing 
strategies. In this paper, we argue that there are differences across carriers in the relationship between 
market conditions and price dispersion. Carriers’ goals (e.g., profit or market share maximization) 
and managerial decisions in segment markets may result in unique carriers’ pricing strategies in 
their segment markets. The data used in this paper show that the extent of price dispersion can vary 
by carriers.5 
The objective of the paper is to provide comprehensive information on individual carriers’ 
pricing strategies. It examines the impacts of individual carriers on price dispersion, categorizes the 
extent and type of price discrimination under different market conditions, and discusses the carriers’ 
pricing strategies in a stylized manner.6 In particular, carriers’ pricing strategies are categorized into 
four types: rigid monopoly-type prices, monopoly-type price discrimination, competitive-type price 
discrimination, and rigid competitive-type prices. This may provide better insight on sources of 
price dispersion and carriers’ pricing strategies. The information may help policymakers and carrier 
managers understand the domestic carriers’ pricing strategies and make their decisions. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner: the section that follows describes the 
extent and type of price discrimination. The third section provides the price dispersion model and 
data description. Discussion of the econometric procedures and the results of price dispersion model 
follow. This paper then presents the estimated price dispersion under different market conditions. 
Based on observed price dispersion and average price, the types of pricing strategies are discussed. 
Finally, concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 
THE EXTENT AND TYPE OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
As discussed in Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Hayes and Ross (1998), price discrimination can 
be an important source of price dispersion by influencing the differences in markups of price over 
cost. This paper attempts to distinguish price dispersion due to monopolistic market forces from that 
due to competitive market forces. To do this we redefine monopoly-type price discrimination and 
competitive-type price discrimination by considering changes in average price and price dispersion.7 
In this paper, monopoly-type price discrimination is defined as discriminatory pricing that increases 
variations in markups of price over cost to the travelers who have low own-price, cross-price, and 
industry elasticities of demand. That is, fare changes of their tickets, other flights, other airlines, 
and other transportation modes do not affect these travelers’ behaviors (e.g., business travelers). 
Therefore, carriers are likely to use monopoly-type price discrimination based on passengers’ 
elasticities of demand, which leads to higher	average	airfares8	and higher	price	dispersion. On the 
other hand, competitive-type price discrimination is defined as discriminatory pricing that increases 
price variations to the travelers who have high own-price, cross-price, and industry elasticities of 
demand. The price changes for their tickets, other flights, other airlines, and other transportation 
modes can largely affect their travel behaviors. For example, vacation travelers are likely to switch 
their reservations to different airlines for lower fares. Thus, competitive-type price discrimination 
may be used by airlines for these vacation travelers, which results in lower	average	airfares and 
greater	price	dispersion. Furthermore, carriers may use rigid pricing strategies when they do not 
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have information on the elasticities of demand. Rigid monopoly-type prices lead to higher	average	
airfares	 and less	 price	 dispersion, while rigid competitive-type prices result in lower	 average	
airfares	and less	price	dispersion. 
Table 1 shows the hypothesized market and carrier characteristics associated with the four 
types of airfares. For the rigid monopoly-type prices, carriers are likely to show a very high level 
of monopolistic behaviors. The markets are highly concentrated and the carriers’ airfares are not 
influenced by fluctuations of cost and demand, which lead to rigid high airfares. For the monopoly-
type price discrimination, carriers are likely to have a moderate or high level of monopolistic 
behaviors. To maximize profits, carriers utilize various types of price discrimination (e.g., second 
and third degree price discrimination), which result in high airfares with more dispersion. For 
competitive-type price discrimination, on the other hand, markets are likely to be highly competitive, 
and carriers may have low airfares with greater dispersion. In such segment markets, the carriers 
would provide various discounted airfares deviated from full airfares. Finally, rigid competitive-
type prices are associated with a very high level of competitive market behaviors, which are close 
to those in the perfect competition or highly competitive market. In the paper, this criterion is used 
to identify the carriers’ pricing strategies for different markets.
Table 1:  Hypothesized Market and Carrier Characteristics Associated with the Four 
  of Pricing Strategies 
Types   
Type
Average 
Price
Level 
of Price 
Dispersion Market and Carrier Characteristics
Type 1 High Low Rigid monopoly-type prices
• High level of monopolistic market behaviors
• High market share
• Highly concentrated markets are likely to increase the level of 
price rigidity (airfares do not depend on fluctuations in cost and 
demand)
• Carriers increase full fares to business travelers and decrease the 
number of discounted airfares to vacation travelers
Type 2 High High Monopoly-type price discrimination
• Carriers use various types of price discrimination to maximize 
their profits including the first degree price discrimination 
(e.g., airfare auction), the second degree price discrimination 
(e.g., block pricing for bulk buy), and the third degree price 
discrimination (e.g., airline websites setting fares that vary by 
class, group, the date of booking, and the time of the flight)
Type 3 Low High Competitive-type price discrimination
• High level of competitive market behaviors
• Passengers have choices in the flight time and airlines (high 
cross-elasticity of demand among brands)
• Airfares may be rapidly adjusted by cost changes
Type 4 Low Low Rigid competitive-type prices
• High level of competitive market behaviors
• Market structure is close to the perfect competition market or 
highly competitive market
• Large number of consumers and carriers
• Potential new entry if markets are profitable
• Carriers provide low-markup airfares to business and vacation 
travelers
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THE PRICE DISPERSION MODEL
Price dispersion is modeled as a function of operating cost factors, demand characteristics, market 
power, and individual carrier effects. Operating cost factors include capacity (ORICAP
i and 
DESCAP
j
), load factor (ORILOAD
i and DESLOADj), flight frequency at origin and destination 
(ORIFREQ
i and DESFREQj), distance (DISTij), round trip (ROUNDij), and ticket restriction 
(RESTRICT
ij
).9  In this paper, the capacity is measured as the average size of aircraft (number of 
seats) and the load factor is calculated by dividing passenger-miles by available seat-miles. The 
capacity, load factor, and flight frequency variables are created by carrier, quarter, and airport (origin 
and destination).
In addition, we use population (AVGPOP
ij
), income (AVGINC
ij
), tourism areas (TOUR
ij
), 
and route variables (ORIHUB
i	
,	 DESHUB
j	
,	 ORISLOT
i	
,	 DESSLOT
j	
,	 ORIMULTIPLE
i	
,	 and	
DESMULTIPLE
j
) as the factors influencing demand for air-passenger service. Dummy variables 
are used for hub airports, slot control airports, and multiple airports available in a city. The ORIHUB
i
 
(DESHUB
j
) is equal to one if an origin (destination) airport is the carrier’s major hub airport. The 
ORISLOT
i
 (DESSLOT
j
) is equal to one if an origin (destination) airport is a slot-controlled airport 
(O’Hare, LaGuardia, JFK, or Ronald Reagan airport). For the ORIMULTIPLE
i
 (DESMULTIPLE
j
), 
it is equal to one if more than one airport is available at origin (destination) city.
Market concentration at origin and destination (ORIHERF
i
 and DESHERF
j
), market share at 
origin and destination (ORISHARE
i
 and DESSHARE
j
), and low cost carrier competition (LOWCOST
ij
) 
are used as market power characteristics. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is employed to measure 
market concentration at origin and destination. For the market share variables, segment market 
share of passengers by carrier is used at origin and destination. The dummy for low cost carrier 
competition is equal to one if the route is served by a low cost carrier (LCC).10 Table 2 provides a 
description of these variables, including how to create the variables.
In addition, dummy variables are included for carriers like American (AA
ij
), United (UA
ij
), Delta 
(DL
ij
), Continental (CO
ij
), Northwest (NW
ij
), and Southwest Airlines (SW
ij
) to capture unobserved 
firms’ effects. The fourth quarter is the base for seasonal comparison (Q1,	Q2,	and	Q3). Specifically, 
the price dispersion from origin i	to destination j is estimated as follows:11       
(1)
where β
i
 are the coefficients of independent variables. The data are arranged by route/airport, carrier, 
quarter, ticket restriction, and round trip. 
This paper uses various variables related to market power, operating cost, and demand 
characteristics as possible sources of price dispersion. First, the Herfindahl index, market share, hub 
airport, and multiple airport variables are used to explore price dispersion in the segment markets. 
Market power characteristics can have positive (negative) influences on price dispersion, depending 
on the dominant impact of monopoly-type (competitive-type) price discrimination in segment 
markets. If monopoly-type price discrimination dominates, the level of price dispersion is likely to 
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increase with market power. In other words, increases in market concentration and market share can 
be associated with more price dispersion under monopoly-type price discrimination. However, if the 
competitive-type price discrimination dominates, the level of price dispersion may decrease with 
market power. Similarly, the existence of multiple airports may lead to less price dispersion under 
monopoly-type price discrimination, while it is likely to result in greater price dispersion under 
competitive-type price discrimination. Therefore, the expected signs of the variables are ambiguous.
Second, this paper addresses a cost-based explanation as well as a discrimination-based 
explanation for price dispersion. If markups of price over cost are held constant, the differences 
in operating costs may influence price dispersion. Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Hayes and 
Ross (1998) discuss peak-load and congestion pricing for the cost-based explanation. Peak-period 
demands should bear all the capital costs of the capacity, whereas off-peak demands should bear only 
operating costs (Pattison 1973). In this paper, an average load factor is used to examine this effect. 
That is, when a flight has a low load factor, airfares are likely to have less dispersion. However, 
when the number of reserved seats reaches the maximum available seats and few seats are left, the 
carrier is likely to charge airfares that lead to high airfare spreads. Similarly, the dummy for slot-
controlled airport (ORISLOT
i
 and DESSLOT
j
) and average capacity of flight are used for the same 
reason. The slot-controlled airports are likely to be more frequently congested than other airports, 
resulting in greater price dispersion. In addition, a high capacity may increase price dispersion 
because flights with a high capacity generally serve a larger number of passengers during on-peak 
periods, and this creates high fare spreads (Borenstein and Rose 1994). Therefore, positive signs 
of the variables are expected. Moreover, total distance, average segment distance, round trip, and 
ticket restriction variables are included on the basis of operating cost differentials. For instance, 
an increase in total distance may reduce operating costs per passenger, which may lead to more 
complicated rate structures and more price dispersion (Hayes and Ross 1998). Similarly, an increase 
in average distance and existence of round trip and ticket restrictions are likely to increase the 
carrier’s ability in utilizing complicated rate structures. Thus, positive signs of these variables can 
be expected.
Third, demand characteristics are used as possible sources of price dispersion. This paper 
includes various demand characteristics (population, income, flight frequency, and seasonal effects) 
because these factors can affect the demand for air-passenger service, which may in turn influence 
price dispersion. Borenstein and Rose (1994) argue that greater population and flight density is 
likely to produce greater equilibrium product variety, which may affect both monopoly-type and 
competitive-type discrimination. For example, a high frequency of flights may increase the demand 
for air-passenger service and reduce industry elasticities, which increase price dispersion. On the 
other hand, frequent flights reduce the time between flight departures and are likely to increase 
cross-elasticities among flights, which may affect price dispersion. The expected impacts of the 
variables are ambiguous. However, for the tourism area variable, a negative sign can be expected 
because a high concentration of vacation travelers in markets is likely to decrease price dispersion 
compared with the markets where business and vacation travelers are evenly distributed.
Data used in this paper come from various sources, including the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the 
U.S. Census Bureau. The primary data sources are the Origin	 and	Destination	 Survey	 (DB1B) 
sample and T-100	Domestic	 Segment data from the U.S. Department of Transportation (Bureau 
of Transportation Statistics 2007). The DB1B contains a 10% sample of tickets from reporting 
carriers, which includes items such as operating and ticketing carriers, number of passengers, and 
airfares. The DB1B is used to measure the Gini coefficient.12 Multiplying the Gini coefficient by two 
shows the expected price difference as a proportion of the mean for two randomly selected tickets 
(Borenstein and Rose 1994). Because of the nature of sample data, we carefully examined and 
eliminated the top and bottom 1% of airfare data to remove outliers.13 The T-100 domestic segment 
data are used to create capacity, load factor, flight frequency, Herfindahl index, and market share 
variables. The T-100 domestic segment data contain items such as numbers of departures, seats, 
Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry
44
and passengers for single-segment markets. American Airlines, United Airlines, Delta Air Lines, 
Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and Southwest Airlines are selected as major carriers in 
this paper because these carriers account for 71% of total domestic passenger-miles in 2005 (Bureau 
of Transportation Statistics 2007).14
This paper uses all U.S. itineraries of economy class (quarterly data) for 2000 and 2005.15 The 
sample sizes for 2000 and 2005 data are 647,816 and 772,210 observations, respectively. As found 
in Table 2, the average Gini coefficients of airfares per passenger-mile from origin i	to destination 
j (PD
ij
) in 2000 and 2005 are 0.19 and 0.20, which are slightly more dispersed than the average 
Gini coefficient (0.18) reported by Borenstein and Rose (1994). The nominal average airfare per 
passenger-mile (P
ij
) dropped by 19% from $0.26 in 2000 to $0.21 in 2005. The average seat capacity 
at origin (ORICAP
i
) and destination (DESCAP
i
) decreased by 18%. The load factors at origin 
(ORILOAD
i
) and at destination (DESLOAD
i
)	averaged 66% in 2000 and 72% in 2005. Upward 
trends in load factor are also found in the T-1 tables, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2007). 
Carriers’ frequency of flights at origin (ORIFREQ
i
) and at destination (DESFREQ
j
) decreased 
by 22% between 2000 and 2005. Total distance (DIST
ij
) averaged 1,320 miles, while the average 
segment distance (AVGDIST
ij
) was approximately 700 miles in both years. The average population 
of origin and destination cities was less than three million. The nominal average per-capita income 
of origin and destination cities was about $31,000 in 2000 and rose to about $36,000 in 2005. 
Market concentration measured by the Herfindahl indexes at origin and destination were roughly 
the same at 0.34 in 2005. Average carrier market share at origin (destination) rose from 0.25 (0.25) 
in 2000 to 0.29 (0.27) in 2005, possibly due to airline consolidation between the two years. 
A total of 56% of the tickets were round-trip. Roughly 80% of the trips departed from or arrived 
in a tourism area. The tourism area (TOUR
ij
) includes a list of 50 tourism cities from the Office	of	
Travel	and	Tourism	Industries, U.S. Department of Commerce	(2007). The dummy is equal to one 
if the market share for 2001 overseas visitors is equal to 0.5% or greater.  Otherwise, it is equal to 
zero.  This paper assumes that overseas and domestic travelers have the same tourist destinations; 
the tourism areas include New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Orlando, San Francisco, Oahu/
Honolulu, Las Vegas, Washington, D.C., and Chicago.
The percentage of tickets with restrictions, such as advance purchase, cancellation penalty, and 
Saturday-night stay, increased from an average of 64% in 2000 to 80% in 2005. Less than 90% of 
the trips originated from the carriers’ own hub airports (ORIHUB
i
), and 90% of the trips arrived in 
a hub airport (DESHUB
j
). Only about 5% of trips involved a slot-controlled airport. Less than one-
third of the trips involved origin or destination cities where multiple airports were present. 
Existence of competition with low-cost carriers (LCC) increased from an average of 34% in 
2000 to 44% in 2005, implying the intensity of competition with LCC rose over time. In the sample 
data, the six carriers constitute 60% of the carriers in 2000, but only 42% in 2005. This 18% drop 
reflects an increase in the number of other carriers (base group) from 40% in 2000 to 58% in 2005. 
Non-major carriers include regional carriers such as JetBlue, Frontier, and Midwest. 
This paper estimates two price dispersion models: the models without carriers’ interaction 
terms (Model 1) and with the interaction terms (Model 2). Model 1 is used to examine the impacts 
of operating cost, demand, market power, and individual carrier factors on price dispersion as shown 
in Eq. (1). On the other hand, Model 2 is used to determine whether individual carriers and market 
conditions interact.
THE ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURES
Diagnostic tests for multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and endogeneity are conducted to provide 
a robust price dispersion model. First, the Breusch-Pagan (1979) and the White (1980) tests 
are used to detect heteroskedasticity in the model. As shown in Table 3, the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity can be rejected at the 5% level of significance in both 2000 and 2005, indicating 
that heteroskedasticity is present in the model. Second, the Hausman exogeneity test is used to check 
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Table 3:  The Results of Heteroskedasticity and Endogeneity Tests in the Price Dispersion  
   Model in 2000 and 2005 a 
 
2000 2005
Heteroskedasticity b
Breusch-Pagan 
Test
F(33, 647,782) = 222**
[0.001]
F(33, 772,176) = 804**
[0.001]
White Test
F(2, 647,813) = 3,163**
[0.001]
F(2, 772,207) = 2,579**
[0.001]
Endogeneity c
ORILOAD
i
0.028**
[0.001]
0.011**
[0.001]
DESLOAD
j
0.017**
[0.001]
0.001
[0.235]
ORIFREQ
i
-0.009**
[0.001]
-0.007**
[0.001]
DESFREQ
j
-0.027**
[0.001]
-0.020**
[0.001]
ORIHERF
i
-0.001**
[0.001]
-0.005**
[0.001]
DESHERF
j
-0.001
[0.384]
-0.005**
[0.001]
ORISHARE
i
-0.002**
[0.001]
-0.005**
[0.001]
DESSHARE
j
-0.001
[0.752]
0.001**
[0.001]
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
a The semi-log form of OLS estimation is used. P-values are shown in parentheses.
b The null hypothesis is homoskedasticity. 
c The null hypothesis is exogeneity of the variable. Parameter estimates of residual are presented.
for the possible endogeneity of load factor, flight frequency, Herfindahl index, and market share 
variables.16 Under competitive-type price discrimination, load factor and flight frequency variables 
may be endogenous since increases in the values of these variables decrease unit operating costs and 
enable the carriers to provide various discounted fares from full fare (more price dispersion), which 
increase vacation travelers’ demand for their services, thereby influencing load factor and frequency 
of service. Similarly, the Herfindahl index and market share variables may all be endogenous 
because increases in these variables can lead to more monopoly-type discrimination (greater price 
dispersion), which may induce a new entry to these markets and, in turn, affect market concentration 
and market share. Table 3 shows that the null hypothesis of exogeneity can be rejected at the 5% 
significance level for most of the variables, indicating that these variables are endogenous. The 
Herfindahl index and market share variables at destination are found to be exogenous for the 2000 
data, and the load factor variable at destination is also exogenous for the 2005 data.  
To remedy the problems of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity, this paper uses the estimation 
that combines feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) and instrumental variable (IV) techniques. 
This heteroskedasticity-corrected IV estimator is more asymptotically consistent than the ordinary 
least squares (OLS). The estimation procedures are as follows: the FGLS is performed by dividing 
all variables in Eq. (1) by the estimated errors. Each of the endogenous variables is then regressed 
on the exogenous variables in Eq. (1) and instruments to obtain the fitted values of the endogenous 
variables.17 Finally, the model is estimated with the exogenous variables and the fitted values of the 
endogenous variables.
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RESULTS OF PRICE DISPERSION MODELS
The Estimation Results
Table 4 shows the results of the heteroskedasticity-corrected IV estimation (Model 1) using the 2000 
and 2005 data. As is apparent from the table, most of the estimated coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level. The findings are summarized as follows: first, operating cost characteristics are found 
to be crucial determinants of price dispersion. Capacity, load factor, average segment distance, 
round trip, and ticket restriction all tend to have positive influences on price dispersion, suggesting 
that the differences in operation characteristics may affect variation in airfares, if markups of price 
over costs are held constant. That is, increases in these variables are likely to lower average unit 
operating costs, which enable the carriers to decrease airfares and utilize more complicated rate 
structures, thereby resulting in greater price dispersion (Hayes and Ross 1998). Second, demand 
characteristics tend to be important determinants of price dispersion. Load factor is found to have a 
positive effect on price dispersion, indicating that higher airfares for on-peak demand and congested 
periods influence price dispersion. For example, when a flight has a low load factor, airfares are 
likely to have less price dispersion. However, if most seats in an aircraft are reserved and few 
seats are available, the carriers are likely to increase airfares, which result in high airfare spreads.18 
Furthermore, slot-controlled airports are likely to be more frequently congested than other airports, 
which may result in greater price dispersion. Slot-controlled airports at origin are found to have 
a higher level of price dispersion for the 2000 and 2005 data. Third, market power and market 
competition are prominent factors in determining price dispersion. Carrier’s market share is shown 
to have a negative effect on price dispersion, indicating that competitive-type price discrimination 
dominates as the market becomes more competitive. Similarly, market concentration, measured by 
the Herfindahl index at origin, appears to have a positive impact on price dispersion.  This implies 
that competitive-type price discrimination dominates when a carrier’s market share is kept constant 
and the market becomes more concentrated around the carrier.  That is, if a carrier’s market power 
shrinks, this is likely to increase competitive-type price discrimination.  Positive impacts of market 
concentration at origin are found in both 2000 and 2005. 
Some variables have mixed impacts on price dispersion between 2000 and 2005. The mixed 
effects may be explained by the carriers’ price discrimination strategies for business and vacation 
travelers, which may produce the offsetting impacts on variations in their airfares. For example, 
market concentration at destination (DESHERF
j
) is found to be positively associated with price 
dispersion in 2005. A higher market concentration around the carrier may increase various 
discounted fares to vacation travelers, leading to greater	 price	 dispersion for lower	 airfares 
(competitive-type price discrimination). On the other hand, a high market concentration around the 
carrier may decrease the number of high mark-up fares to business travelers, thereby resulting in 
less	price	dispersion for lower	airfares. If this effect is larger than the impact of competitive-type 
discrimination on price dispersion for total airfares, a higher market concentration may reduce price 
dispersion. These mixed effects indicate that a decrease in market power may have a positive or 
negative influence on price dispersion, depending on the carrier’s price discrimination strategies for 
business and vacation travelers.  
The carrier dummies are all statistically significant at the 5% level in 2000 and 2005, indicating 
that the individual carriers are pronounced determinants of price dispersion. Among the six carriers, 
American, United, Delta, Continental, and Northwest are associated with less price dispersion, 
while Southwest has greater price dispersion in 2000. This indicates that, relative to non-major 
carriers, all major carriers but Southwest may have adopted price discrimination strategies that lead 
to less dispersion for that year. Nevertheless, we observe a shift of pricing strategies for United, 
Delta, and Northwest that result in greater price dispersion in 2005. These dummy variables appear 
to show that unobserved factors, such as firms’ management styles and strategies, may result in the 
adoption of different pricing strategies over time. Since 2000, Southwest Airlines has been able to 
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation of Price Dispersion in 2000 and 2005
Variable Parameter Estimate a
2000 2005
INTERCEPT
-0.5113**
(0.0210)
-0.4463**
(0.0215)
ORICAP
i
0.0253**
(0.0002)
0.0299**
(0.0002)
ORILOAD
i
0.0277**
(0.0013)
0.0104**
(0.0015)
ORIFREQ
i
0.0121**
(0.0015)
-0.0158**
(0.0010)
DESCAP
j
0.0162**
(0.0002)
0.0104**
(0.0002)
DESLOAD
j
0.0254**
(0.0012)
0.0069**
(0.0014)
DESFREQ
j
0.0162**
(0.0013)
0.0256**
(0.0010)
DIST
ij
-0.1222**
(0.0045)
-0.1737**
(0.0025)
AVGDIST
ij
0.1334**
(0.0035)
0.1734**
(0.0024)
ROUND
ij
0.0374**
(0.0004)
0.0304**
(0.0004)
TOUR
ij
-0.0118**
(0.0016)
0.0096**
(0.0008)
RESTRICT
ij
0.0966**
(0.0007)
0.0799**
(0.0009)
AVGPOP
ij
0.0024**
(0.0005)
0.0042**
(0.0005)
AVGINC
ij
0.0025
(0.0028)
0.0043*
(0.0021)
ORIHUB
i
0.0533**
(0.0048)
-0.0052**
(0.0019)
ORISLOT
i
0.0267**
(0.0025)
0.0011
(0.0015)
ORIHERF
i
0.0936**
(0.0081)
0.0075*
(0.0037)
ORISHARE
i
-0.0051**
(0.0002)
-0.0072**
(0.0002)
DESHUB
j
0.0175**
(0.0051)
-0.0130**
(0.0019)
DESSLOT
j
0.0114**
(0.0029)
-0.0221**
(0.0015)
DESHERF
j
0.0238**
(0.0087)
-0.0570**
(0.0036)
DESSHARE
j
-0.0031**
(0.0002)
-0.0007**
(0.0002)
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Table 4: Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation of Price Dispersion in 2000 and 2005 (cont.)
LOWCOST
ij
0.0223**
(0.0022)
-0.0051**
(0.0012)
ORIMULTIPLE
i
-0.0200**
(0.0016)
-0.0015*
(0.0007)
DESMULTIPLE
j
-0.0084**
(0.0018)
0.0080**
(0.0007)
AA
ij
-0.0143**
(0.0008)
-0.0046**
(0.0001)
UA
ij
-0.0305**
(0.0007)
0.0095**
(0.0009)
DL
ij
-0.0209**
(0.0007)
0.0293**
(0.0008)
CO
ij
-0.0194**
(0.0010)
-0.0153**
(0.0011)
NW
ij
-0.0162**
(0.0007)
0.0203**
(0.0008)
SW
ij
0.0075**
(0.0011)
0.0688**
(0.0013)
Q1
-0.0064**
(0.0006)
0.0015*
(0.0006)
Q2
-0.0002
(0.0006)
0.0020**
(0.0006)
Q3
0.0030**
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0006)
Adjusted	R2 0.2720 0.2216
F-value 7,335 6,662
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
a Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
save billions of dollars by skillfully hedging against rising oil prices, while many of its competitors 
paid substantially more for oil on the spot market.19 This low fuel price translates into cost savings 
for Southwest, which, in turn, enables it to charge lower airfares and raise market share. Firms that 
pay higher fuel prices need to pass the higher cost to consumers or absorb the cost and incur a loss. 
However, as favorably as hedging worked for Southwest, fuel-price hedging does require large 
initial cash outlays. Many carriers either cannot afford or do not plan to adopt the hedging strategies. 
On the other hand, instead of hedging against rising oil prices or slashing airfares to compete with 
discount carriers, Continental and American Airlines target business travelers who are less price-
sensitive (Farzad 2006). This may help explain the consistently less dispersed prices charged by the 
two companies in both 2000 and 2005. 
Model 2 is employed to determine whether individual carriers and market conditions interact in 
the price dispersion model.20 Market condition variables (hub airport, tourism areas, market share, 
and market competition) are assumed to be beyond carriers’ control. However, these factors could 
affect individual carriers’ strategic and pricing decisions. Hence, interactions between firm and 
market condition variables are essential and could shed some light on firms’ pricing strategies under 
various market conditions. Overall, many of the estimated coefficients appear to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level.21 Based on the results of the interaction models, the effects of individual 
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carriers on price dispersion depend on the value (or existence) of market conditions, suggesting that 
Model 2 is more appropriate than Model 1 for predicting price dispersion. 
Estimated Carriers’ Price Dispersion
This section presents the magnitude of differences in price dispersion among carriers under different 
market conditions. To obtain estimated price dispersion, we use the parameter estimates from Model 
2 and mean values of our sample.  
Table 5 provides the results of estimated price dispersion of the carriers for the different market 
conditions in 2000 and 2005. The table includes the dispersion differences of the six major carriers to 
non-major carriers to discuss their price discrimination strategies. In 2005, for flights originating from 
a hub airport (ORIHUB
i	
), estimated Gini coefficients are higher for United (0.21), Delta (0.23), and 
Northwest (0.22) than non-major carriers (0.20), indicating that these carriers are likely to increase 
price discrimination and, therefore, lead to greater dispersion. On the other hand, Continental (0.19) 
is found to have less price dispersion than non-major carriers. Flights with destinations of hub 
airports (DESHUB
j
) are shown to have similar differences in the estimated Gini coefficients among 
the carriers. For the tourism area markets (TOUR
ij	
) in 2005, the estimated Gini coefficients are higher 
for United, Delta, Northwest, and Southwest than for non-major carriers, whereas they are lower 
for American and Continental in the same comparison. In particular, Southwest is found to have a 
much higher level of price dispersion than any other carriers, suggesting that Southwest increases 
competitive-type price discrimination. Using the 2005 mean characteristics of market concentration 
at the origin (ORIHERF
i	
),22 estimated Gini coefficients are higher for United, Delta, Northwest, and 
Southwest than for the non-major carriers. On the other hand, estimated Gini coefficients are lower 
for American and Continental in the same comparison. Most of the carriers have differences similar 
to ORIHERF
i
using the mean value of market concentration at destination (DESHERF ) j	 . In addition, 
for the average market shares at origin (ORISHARE
i	
) and destination	DESSHARE
j	
), United, Delta, 
Northwest, and Southwest have greater price dispersion than the other non-major carriers, whereas 
American and Continental have less price dispersion in the same comparison. 
Overall, the results indicate that United, Delta, Northwest, and Southwest may have price 
discrimination strategies that lead to greater price dispersion than the non-major carriers, regardless 
of market conditions in 2005. In particular, Southwest has much greater price dispersion, ranging 
from 32% to 43% higher than the non-major carriers. In contrast, American and Continental appear 
to have consistent price discrimination strategies, which lead to less price dispersion than the non-
major carriers for all market conditions. 
As shown in the table, the patterns of the carriers’ price dispersion change for the period 2000-
2005. For example, United and Delta have a higher level of price dispersion than the non-major 
carriers for all of the market conditions in 2005, but these carriers have a lower level of dispersion in 
the same comparison for all of the market conditions in 2000. Similarly, Northwest has greater price 
dispersion for all market conditions in 2005. It is found to have more or less dispersion, depending 
on the market conditions, in 2000. The most distinct changes in estimated price dispersion for 
the 2000-2005 period are for Southwest. Although the carrier is still found to have greater price 
dispersion than other carriers in 2000, the differences in its price dispersion to the non-major carriers 
is much smaller than those in 2005. The dispersion differences of Southwest to non-major carriers 
range from +5% to +6% in 2000, whereas they are between +32% to +43% in 2005. This supports 
evidence that the carriers’ price discrimination strategies may change over the period, thereby 
affecting price dispersion. 
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Table 5:  Estimated Price Dispersion (Gini Coefficient) and Price Dispersion Difference by   
  Carrier in 2000 and 2005 a
Year Interaction Estimated Price Dispersion (Gini Coefficient)
AA UA DL CO NW SW Others
2005
ORIHUB
i
0.20
(-0%)
0.21
(+5%)
0.23
(+15%)
0.19
(-5%)
0.22
(+10%)
N/A b 0.20
(0%)
DESHUB
j
0.19
(-5%)
0.21
(+5%)
0.23
(+15%)
0.18
(-10%)
0.21
(+5%)
N/A b 0.20
(0%)
TOUR
ij
0.21
(-5%)
0.23
(+5%)
0.25
(+14%)
0.20
(-9%)
0.24
(+9%)
0.29
(+32%)
0.22
(0%)
ORIHERF
i
0.20
(-5%)
0.24
(+14%)
0.26
(+24%)
0.20
(-5%)
0.22
(+5%)
0.28
(+33%)
0.21
(0%)
DESHERF
j
0.21
(-0%)
0.24
(+14%)
0.25
(+19%)
0.21
(-0%)
0.26
(+24%)
0.28
(+33%)
0.21
(0%)
ORISHARE
i
0.20
(-5%)
0.22
(+5%)
0.24
(+14%)
0.19
(-10%)
0.21
(+0%)
0.30
(+43%)
0.21
(0%)
DESSHARE
j
0.20
(-5%)
0.22
(+5%)
0.24
(+14%)
0.19
(-10%)
0.24
(+14%)
0.28
(+33%)
0.21
(0%)
2000
ORIHUB
i
0.23
(-4%)
0.21
(-13%)
0.22
(-8%)
0.22
(-8%)
0.23
(-4%)
N/Ab 0.24
(0%)
DESHUB
j
0.18
(-5%)
0.17
(-11%)
0.18
(-5%)
0.16
(-16%)
0.17
(-11%)
N/Ab
0.19
(0%)
TOUR
ij
0.16
(-11%)
0.15
(-17%)
0.16
(-11%)
0.16
(-11%)
0.16
(-11%)
0.19
(+6%)
0.18
(0%)
ORIHERF
i
0.20
(+5%)
0.18
(-5%)
0.17
(-11%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.19
(-0%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.19
(0%)
DESHERF
j
0.20
(+5%)
0.18
(-5%)
0.17
(-11%)
0.21
(+11%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.19
(0%)
ORISHARE
i
0.17
(-11%)
0.16
(-16%)
0.17
(-11%)
0.17
(-11%)
0.18
(-5%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.19
(0%)
DESSHARE
j
0.18
(-5%)
0.16
(-16%)
0.18
(-5%)
0.19
(-0%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.20
(+5%)
0.19
(0%)
a The price dispersion differences relative to the non-major carriers (Others) are presented in parentheses.
b Not applicable because Southwest does not use major hub airports.
THE COMBINED RESULTS OF ESTIMATION OF PRICE DISPERSION AND 
AVERAGE PRICE 
In addition to a price dispersion model, we examine the average price using the same set of 
independent variables and the same observations. The average price model uses the average airfares 
weighted by the number of passengers (P
ij
 in Table 2) as the dependent variable. The combined 
results may provide a better explanation for each of the variables associated with one of the four types 
of pricing strategies: rigid monopoly-type prices, monopoly-type price discrimination, competitive-
type price discrimination, and rigid competitive-type prices. For example, if a carrier has a positive 
impact on industry average price and a negative impact on price dispersion, the carrier’s airfares 
are categorized as rigid monopoly-type prices. On the other hand, if a carrier has a positive impact 
on both average price and price dispersion, the carrier’s airfares are categorized as monopoly-type 
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price discrimination. A similar explanation is used for competitive-type prices. Thus, this approach 
can distinguish price dispersion due to monopoly-type discrimination from price dispersion due to 
competitive-type discrimination. We answer the question of how high is high and how low is low by 
comparing major carriers’ price dispersion with the non-major carriers. 
Table 6 shows the four types of pricing strategies for the major carriers given the market 
conditions in 2000 and 2005. American and Continental tend to have rigid prices under various 
market conditions in 2005. While American has both rigid monopoly-type and rigid competitive-
type prices depending on market conditions, Continental has rigid monopoly-type prices for all of the 
market conditions. On the other hand, Northwest appears to use monopoly-type price discrimination 
for all of the market conditions. In addition, United uses both monopoly-type and competitive-
type price discriminations, based on market conditions. Delta and Southwest have competitive-type 
price discrimination, and these carriers have the same type of price discrimination for all market 
conditions. Overall, the results enable us to distinguish the sources of carriers’ price dispersion. 
For example, Northwest and Delta have greater price dispersion than non-major carriers, but the 
sources that accounted for their price dispersions are different. The price dispersion of Northwest 
may result from monopoly-type price discrimination strategies, whereas that of Delta may result 
from competitive-type price discrimination strategies. 
In contrast to 2005, most of the carriers have different types of pricing strategies under the 
market conditions in 2000. American, United, Delta, Continental, and Northwest all have rigid 
monopoly-type prices for the markets with hub airports and tourism areas in 2000. At the mean value 
of the Herfindahl indexes, American, Continental, Northwest, and Southwest have competitive-type 
price discrimination. In addition, United, Delta, and Continental have rigid competitive-type prices 
at the mean value of origin and destination market shares. Overall, all carriers, except Southwest, 
adopt different types of pricing strategies depending on the market conditions. Only Southwest 
uses competitive-type price discrimination under all market conditions. Thus, this paper provides 
evidence that the carriers’ pricing strategies may vary, depending on the market conditions and the 
time periods. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper explores price dispersion in the U.S. airline industry and discusses the domestic carriers’ 
pricing strategies. With quarterly observations for 2000 and 2005, we combined empirical results of 
price dispersion and average price to provide information on the sources of carriers’ price dispersion. 
The findings are summarized as follows. First, operating cost, demand, and market power 
characteristics are important determinants of price dispersion. For example, price dispersion 
increases with capacity, load factor, and average segment distance, implying that these operating 
cost factors affect price dispersion when price markups over costs are held constant. Similarly, 
price dispersion increases with market power, indicating that carriers’ dominant power influences 
variation of markups if operating costs are fixed. Special attention is given to individual carriers’ 
price discrimination strategies. American, United, Delta, Continental, and Northwest have less 
price dispersion, while Southwest has greater price dispersion in 2000. Regarding the impacts of 
individual carriers on price dispersion between 2000 and 2005, United, Delta, and Northwest are 
found to have less price dispersion for the periods of 2000 and 2005. This implies that these two 
carriers changed their price discrimination strategies for the 2000-2005 period.
Second, this paper examines the interactions between carriers and market conditions. In 
examining hub airport, tourism areas, market share, and market competition, we find that the effect 
of individual carriers on price dispersion depends on these market conditions. This indicates that 
the carriers may use different pricing strategies depending on conditions of segment markets. For 
example, the threat of higher competition or characteristics of segment markets may affect individual 
carriers’ pricing decision in such markets.
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Third, given the estimated price dispersion and average airfare, major carriers’ pricing strategies 
are categorized in a stylized manner to improve our understanding of the types of pricing strategies 
the carriers use under different market conditions. For instance, in 2005, both Northwest and Delta 
have a higher level of price dispersion than non-major carriers. However, sources for the price 
dispersion are found to be different. Monopoly-type price discrimination is likely to result in price 
dispersion for Northwest, while competitive-type price discrimination is likely to lead to price 
dispersion for Delta. Therefore, this paper provides evidence that the type of the pricing strategies 
is not the same across carriers.  
Endnotes
1. Stigler (1987) and Varian (1989) provide the explanations for discriminatory prices based on 
differences in price markups and cost.
2. Price dispersion can be defined as variation in airfares charged for the same ticket across carriers, 
holding all other characteristics constant.  There are two major sources of price dispersion: 
1) heterogeneities in costs or service levels and 2) pricing strategies by carriers.
3. The terms “monopoly-type price discrimination” and “competitive-type price discrimination” 
were first coined by Borenstein and Rose (1994). They used both group’s “industry” elasticity 
of demand (e.g., air travel on a given route) and group’s cross-elasticity of demand among 
specific brands (e.g., flight time and airlines) to define these types of price discrimination. If a 
market is more competitive, the segment passengers based on their cross-elasticity of demand 
are likely to produce a higher level of price dispersion (competitive-type price discrimination). 
On the other hand, monopoly-type discrimination, in which passengers are sorted by their 
industry elasticities of demand, is likely to create a higher level of price dispersion when a 
market is closer to monopoly.
4. It should be noted that U.S. airline industry is not a contestable market based on theoretical and 
empirical findings. A contestable market is a market structure in which entry into an industry 
is free and exit is costless, which makes the potential new entrants affect the price decisions 
of incumbent firms (Griffiths and Ison 2001). Theoretically, the requirements of contestable 
markets do not apply in most of the city-pair markets because carriers need capital resources to 
enter new markets. In addition, many empirical studies found that perfect contestability is not 
applicable in the U.S. airline industry (Graham et al. 1983; Bailey et al. 1985; Morrison and 
Winston 1987). This implies that the threat of entry is not constraining airfares to competitive 
levels on city-pair markets.
5. For example, Gini coefficients are 0.38 for Southwest Airlines and 0.22 for Northwest Airlines 
in 2005.
6. Hayes and Ross (1998) also included carrier effects (e.g., Southwest Airlines) in a price 
dispersion model, but did not provide conclusive findings because of mixed signs of coefficients.
7. This paper modifies the definitions of the two types of price discrimination given by Borenstein 
and Rose (1994) by using average prices and price dispersion. This slight modification enables 
one to clearly identify different types of pricing strategies based on empirical results.
8. Given constant cost, higher (lower) average airfares imply larger (smaller) markups over the 
cost.
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9. Some operating cost characteristics may also influence demand characteristics.
10. A list of low-cost carriers (LCCs) is collected from Ito and Lee (2003). The LCCs include 
Air South, Access Air, AirTran, American Trans Air, Eastwind, Frontier, JetBlue, Kiwi, Morris 
Air, National, Pro Air, Reno, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country, ValuJet, Vanguard, and Western 
Pacific.
11. The semi-log form showed better model performance in terms of a better fit and the number of 
significant variables. This paper used one-way route data, which included both direct and non-
direct flights and did not combine the city-pair data for A to B and B to A routes (e.g., LAX-ORD 
and ORD-LAX).” In addition, we built route-specific variables by itinerary, carrier, quarter and 
other flight characteristics (e.g., AVGPOP
ij
) and airport-specific variables by airport, carrier, 
quarter and other flight characteristics (e.g., ORICAP
i
and DESCAP j). Because route data were 
not available for capacity, load factor, flight frequency, Herfindahl index, carrier’s market share, 
and multiple airports, we used airport-specific variables in this paper.
12. The Gini coefficient is calculated as follows:
 
PD P
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PAX
total PAX
P
ij i
i
i N
i
= − × × × + −∑

1 2 11,
AX
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j
j i
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




1,
  
 where N is the number of different airfare tickets from origin i to destination j, P
i
	 is the 
reported airfare for the ith ticket, and PAX
i
 is the number of passengers traveling at that rate 
(Borenstein and Rose 1994). This paper uses the Gini coefficient because it is the most widely 
used inequality index and has a major advantage of the simple relationship to the Lorenz curve 
(Sheret 1991). It is simply equal to twice the area between the line of equality and the Lorenz 
curve, and therefore it is more intuitive than other indices.
13. We adopt the method used by Bitzan and Chi (2006), which results in removing any fares 
higher than $1.22 and $1.20 per passenger-mile for 2000 and 2005 data in this paper.
14. It should be noted that major carriers used in this paper are not the “official” use of the term 
denoting carriers with more than $1 billion in revenue during a fiscal year.  They are the top 
six carriers that accounted for 71% of total domestic passenger-miles in 2005. The remainder 
defined as non-major carriers in this paper have only 29% of total passenger-miles.
15. Years 2000 and 2005 are selected because they do not appear to have a negative impact of the 
terrorist attacks of 2001. These years have the upward trend in passenger-miles for domestic 
air-service before and after the September 11, 2001. In addition, the year 2005 is also the most 
recent annual data available in February, 2006.
16. Borenstein and Rose (1994) treat flight frequency, market share, and Herfindahl index variables 
as possible endogenous variables and find that there is some evidence of endogeneity for flight 
frequency and market share, but none for the Herfindahl index. It is worth noting that entry and 
exit by LCCs may be also endogenous.  However, it is impossible to determine whether LCCs 
decide to enter (exit) under what specific conditions and the authors do not have privileged firm 
information of economic or financial reasons for entry (exit). Furthermore, the Hausman test 
results showed that exogeneity of the LOWCOST
ij
cannot be rejected at the 5% significance 
 level. 
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17. We carefully control for the endogeneity problem by using adequate instruments. The 
instruments used in this paper include lagged values of load factor, flight frequency, Herfindahl 
index and market share variables. In the first stage, we found that the R2 are high, indicating that 
the instruments explain variations in the endogenous variables well.
18. Pattison (1973) also argues that the peak-load prices should bear all the capacity costs, when the 
total capacity is fully utilized at on-peak times.
19. For example, in 2008, 70% of Southwest’s fuel needs are hedged at a price of $51 per barrel, 
while its rivals are paying over or about $120 per barrel (Herbst 2008).  
20. This paper used each of the market factors separately and estimated it with all of the carrier’s 
dummies. This produces a simple model with the least number of highly correlated variables 
and the fewest independent variables.  If all of the interaction terms are added to the base 
model, it generates a large number of highly correlated variables and the number of explanatory 
variables increases.
21. The results show that 30 and 32 interaction terms are significant out of 40 total interactions in 
2000 and 2005, respectively. The results of the interaction model (Model 2) are not included 
due to a large quantity of tables, but they are available upon request.
22. This paper uses 0.34 and 0.33 of the Herfindahl index at origin (ORIHERF
i
) and destination 
(DESHERF
j
) for 2000 and 29% and 27% of carrier’s market share at origin (ORISHARE
i
) and 
destination (DESSHARE
j
) for 2005, respectively. 
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